By Bamo Nouri and Inderjeet Parmar
Ceasefires are often presented as moments of relief – pauses in violence that open the door to diplomacy. But sometimes they reveal something more consequential: who has actually gained from the war. The emerging ceasefire between the US, Israel and Iran may be one of those moments.
On the surface, all sides are claiming success. Donald Trump has declared a “total and complete victory”, presenting the agreement as evidence that US objectives have been met. Meanwhile, Iran’s leadership has framed the ceasefire as a strategic achievement, with its Supreme National Security Council formally endorsing the deal on the condition that attacks stop.
But beneath these competing narratives lies a deeper reality: the content and structure of the ceasefire suggests that Iran may have emerged not weakened, but strengthened. While much of its senior leadership has been assassinated during the conflict, the regime’s ability to rapidly appoint replacements and maintain cohesion points to institutional resilience rather than collapse.
The ceasefire was not imposed by decisive military defeat. It was negotiated – and shaped – around Iranian conditions, delivering gains it previously did not have, with Tehran’s ten-point plan serving as a starting framework for negotiations rather than a finalised agreement being imposed on Iran.
Tehran’s proposals went beyond ending hostilities. They include sanctions relief, access to frozen assets, reconstruction support and continued influence over the Strait of Hormuz. They also include effective US withdrawal from the Middle East – and an end to Israeli attacks on Lebanon.
The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil transits, has been reopened under Iranian oversight, a clear signal of where leverage now lies. Control over Hormuz is not just strategic but economic. Iran has reportedly proposed continuing the charging of transit fees it begin during the conflict – creating a potential revenue stream at precisely the moment reconstruction is needed.
In effect, a war that involved sustained bombing of Iranian infrastructure may now leave Iran with new financial mechanisms to rebuild and potentially expand its regional influence.
The logic is paradoxical but familiar. Military campaigns are designed to degrade an opponent’s capabilities. But when they fail to produce decisive political outcomes, they often create new opportunities for the targeted state. Iran entered this war already adapted to pressure. Years of sanctions had forced it to build resilience by diversifying networks, strengthening institutions and developing asymmetric strategies.
What the war appears to have done is accelerate that process. Rather than collapsing, Iran has demonstrated its ability to disrupt global energy markets, absorb sustained strikes and force negotiations on terms that include economic concessions.
Illusion of victory
This is where the dissonance in US messaging becomes most visible. The US president may have framed the ceasefire as a “complete victory” but, tellingly, while the ceasefire deal will involve the temporary reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which has been the US president’s main demand in recent days, talks will centre on Iran’s ten-point plan rather than the original US 15-point plan, which centred on dismantling Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities.
The shift suggests an American search for an off-ramp. At the same time, Iran has maintained a consistent position: rejecting temporary arrangements unless they deliver structural outcomes such as sanctions relief and security guarantees.
For Washington the ceasefire halts escalation and stabilises markets. For Tehran, it aims to consolidate the leverage offered by its control of the Strait of Hormuz. This asymmetry suggests the ceasefire is not a neutral pause, but a moment that could lock in a shift in regional power.
The most decisive dimension of this shift is economic. The war has destabilised global markets – with oil prices fluctuating sharply in response to disruptions of supply. But the ceasefire introduces a new dynamic. If sanctions are eased, Iran gains access to global markets at a time of sustained energy demand. Combined with potential transit revenues and reconstruction flows, this creates the conditions for a significant economic rebound.
In effect, the war risks producing the opposite of its intended outcome. Rather than weakening Iran economically, it may instead have strengthened it.
A stronger Iran, a weaker order?
This raises a larger question: what does this ceasefire reveal about power itself? For decades, US influence in the Middle East has rested on military dominance and economic pressure. This conflict suggests both are under strain.
Militarily, the US and Israel have demonstrated overwhelming capability, yet without decisive outcomes. Iran has retained its core capacities, maintained cohesion and leveraged its position to shape deescalation.
At the same time, US and Israeli legitimacy has eroded. The war’s contested justification, civilian toll and lack of broad international support have weakened their standing, even among allies. American soft power – long central to its global leadership – is diminished. Trump’s increasingly abusive social media posts have certainly alienated even its closest allies, most of whom stayed silent in face of US threats.
Economically, Iran’s ability to influence – and potentially monetise – global energy flows gives it a form of structural power that force alone cannot neutralise. The result is a paradox: a war intended to contain Iran may have reinforced its strength.
It is still early. Ceasefires can collapse, negotiations can fail, and conflicts can reignite. But if this agreement holds – even temporarily – it may mark a turning point. Not because it ends the war, but because of what it reveals about how wars are now won and lost. Victory is no longer defined by battlefield dominance alone, but by outcomes that are economically sustainable, politically legitimate and strategically durable.
On those measures, Iran appears well positioned. The US and Israel may have demonstrated military superiority. But Iran has demonstrated something different: the ability to endure, adapt and convert pressure into leverage.
That’s why this ceasefire matters; not just as an end to a phase of conflict, but marking the moment when a war intended to weaken Iran instead left it stronger – and exposed the limits of the power that sought to contain it.
Bamo Nouri is Honorary Research Fellow in the Department of International Politics, City St George’s, University of London, and Inderjeet Parmar
is Professor in International Politics at City St George’s, University of London.
Sherry says
Tomorrow will tell the tale. Please be sure to get your report from the AP, and NOT Fox BS.
PaulT says
I wonder, if the ceasefire holds, if it leads to a longer term peace agreement between the US and Iran, will Donald Trump claim it as another of his ‘Amazing’ string of ‘Peace Deals’?
Even though he started this war?
Bob says
Trump started this War without any plans from start to finish and now Iran has the upper hand on which oil tanks get to go through the channel. And not Iran is charging 2 million dollars to pass through. It wasn’t that way prior to Trumps attack on them.
Trump made this situation worse than before.
Trump has placed our country in a dangerous position around the world.
Remember all these things next time you go vote.
virginia says
The toll for passage through the straits will not stand. Sets a very bad precedent.
Ray W. says
Early during the morning hours of April 7, 2026, Pakistan’s Prime Minister announced immediate onset of ceasefire in the Iran War.
Yesterday, April 11, Reuters reported that through April 10th, a total of 15 ships had transmitted the Strait of Hormuz since onset of ceasefire, according to ship tracking data. Of course, ships can turn off electronic data emitters, so more ships may have sailed through the Strait.
Today, NBC News reports that two U.S. Navy destroyers went through the Strait on April 11th, and zero commercial vessels.
Before outbreak of war, between 130 and 160 ships passed through the Strait each day.
Make of this what you will.
Me?
I have no idea what to understand, other than that it has been 43 days since war came to much of the Middle East. So many regional governments present as having their own ideas of what defines success, based on long-adopted policies.
Saudi Arabia, a largely Sunni country, is said to want the war to continue against Shia-majority Iran. Israel acts as if its government wants attacks on Iran to never end, in order to allow it to continue its policies of expansion into Lebanon. Oman is said to be negotiating with Iran on how to manage traffic through the Strait. And then there are the Yemeni Houthis, sitting on the throat into and out of the Suez Canal.
President Trump, almost immediately after striking Iran, started to claim that the war had been won on day one; now he claims that Iran “has no cards”, yet the Strait remains virtually closed and Iran keeps firing missiles and drones.
It is being reported that “marathon” talks taking place in Pakistan between the U.S. and Iran have broken down. The U.S. is soon to begin implementing a blockade of the Strait, effectively stopping all export of Iranian oil. Many of the few oil and LNG tankers leaving the Strait since outbreak of war have been laden with fuel loaded from Iranian ports. Is it appropriate to call a blockade an escalation of the war?
Every passing day without fossil fuels exiting the Persian Gulf region draws down previously built up international crude oil and natural gas reserves. International demand has dropped somewhat, but not as much as the roughly 15% drop in international supply of crude oil. As numerous energy experts put it, what was originally considered a paper, or theoretical, international crude oil and natural gas shortage will soon enough become a significant actual physical shortage, should storage facilities in country after country physically empty.
The Montreaux Convention of 1936 established a legal process for controlling international shipping passing through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The Convention of Constantinople of 1888 controls international shipping through the Suez Canal. But no specific legal convention controls shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
Ray W. says
The news outlet, Seeking Alpha, drew from a recent Kepler paper on U.S. exports of crude oil for a story on the impact of the Iran War.
During March, 2026, daily exports of U.S. crude oil were at 3.9 million barrels. Kepler, an oil research firm, projects that by the end of May, daily U.S. crude oil exports will reach 5.2 million barrels per day.
Prior to the war, on an average day, 24 empty oil tankers were en route to U.S. ports. From the paper, 68 empty tankers are heading towards American ports.
As an aside, the U.S. Energy Department Secretary, Chris Wright, commented the other day that the U.S. still consumes roughly 20 million barrels worth of refined crude oil products each day. We extracted, on average, about 13.5 million barrels of crude oil per day in 2025, per EIA reporting. The closure of the Strait over the past six weeks or so, has removed between 10 and 15 million barrels of crude oil per day from international markets.
Make of this what you will.
Me?
Some reports have the number of crude oil and natural gas tankers stranded on the wrong side of the Strait of Hormuz at 800, per an April 8 Bloomberg article. If that number is accurate, that means that, right now, worldwide fossil fuel transport capacity has to be constrained.
As I have previously commented, even were Strait to fully open today, some 800 fully filled fuel tankers flooding out of the Persian Gulf into foreign seaports could snarl today’s international capacity to offload that much cargo at once.
PaulT says
Negotiations stalled in Islamabad so now the ‘Genius’ in the White House has abruptly changed course.
Instead of: “Open the Straits of Hormuz or we’ll annihilate you”
we have “I’m ordering our mighty navy to blockade the Straits of Hormuz”
any (“If you pay Charon to cross the Styx we’ll send you straight to hell”)
Iran was supposed to ‘negotiate’ with a United States team of two millionaire realtors seeking property deals and ‘Mr Angry’, VP Vance, not known his diplomatic finesse but notorious for telling a desperate ally to thank the almighty Trump for his benificent generosity.
It was clearly a hopeless endeavor.
This is not the dawn of a golden age, it’s descent into an age of US led insanity.